Political Appointments and Judicial Independence—An Unreasonable Expectation by Alarcon, Arthur S.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
1-1-1983
Political Appointments and Judicial
Independence—An Unreasonable Expectation
Arthur S. Alarcon
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law
School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Arthur S. Alarcon, Political Appointments and Judicial Independence—An Unreasonable Expectation, 16 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 9 (1983).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol16/iss1/2
POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS AND JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE - AN UNREASONABLE
EXPECTATION"
By The Honorable Arthur S. Alarcon*
Prior to ascending into the obscurity and sanctuary provided by a
position on the United States Court of Appeals, I was for twelve years a
California trial judge and for seventeen months an associate justice of
the California Court of Appeal. Looking out of the window of my fed-
eral ivory tower, I view with great alarm the political turmoil which
now has sadly engulfed some of my former state colleagues.
Unfortunately, this is not a new problem. Those of you who are
acquainted with the legal career of Thomas More know that when ap-
pointed to the position of Lord High Chancellor of England in 1529, he
had been a prominent lawyer, trial judge, and chancellor of the Duchy
of Lancaster. He was probably the most exceptionally well qualified
person to serve as a judge in the history of our profession. Yet, in 1532,
he felt compelled to resign as Lord High Chancellor because, as he put
it, he was "not equal to the work." In fact, he resigned because he
could not tolerate the fact that Henry the VIII was manipulating the
laws of England to resolve his personal problems.
In 1535, Thomas More was convicted of high treason because of
his refusal to give his opinion as to whether Henry the VIII was the
Supreme Head of the Church. Thomas More lost his life because of
the value he placed on freedom of thought and independence. Fortu-
nately, for those of us who sit as judges in the United States, the price
of integrity is not quite that high.
Interference with judicial independence by English kings did not
end with Henry the VIII. Two and one-half centuries after Thomas
More died, George the III's political control and domination of judges
became the subject of one of the grievances set forth in the Declaration
of Independence. That remarkable document states: "He has made
judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and
the amount and payment of their salaries." The judges in the colonies
t Text of a speech delivered on March 2, 1982, in acceptance of the Medallion award
of the St. Thomas More Law Honor Society. Judge Alarcon was introduced by Warren
Ettinger, Attorney, Hufstedler, Miller, Carlson & Beardsley, Los Angeles.
* United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
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served at George the III's pleasure, instead of during good behavior as
had been guaranteed in England since 1701.
Ironically, nothing has really changed since George the III. Each
year, for the last several years, Congress has rejected the unanimous
recommendation of the commission - created by statute - which fixes
the salaries of federal judges based on the cost of living. In California,
former Governor Brown had successfully modified the laws which pro-
vided for automatic cost-of-living increases. The Governor also at-
tempted, unsuccessfully, to deny cost-of-living increases for certain
years.
All California appellate judges are appointed by the governor.
Newly created trial court positions are filled by gubernatorial appoint-
ment. Vacancies which occur by death, resignation, or retirement prior
to the expiration of a term are also filled by the governor. During the
last seven years, the former governor had appointed 700 judges to the
trial court, approximately thirty-six to the California Court of Appeal,
and five of the seven judges on the California Supreme Court.
The choices the Governor had made for each of these positions
were his alone. Under the present law, the governor need not consult
anyone in selecting the person he wishes to appoint to the bench. Re-
cent legislation has compelled him to submit these choices to the Com-
mission on Judicial Nominees Evaluation. The governor is not under
any duty to follow the Commission's recommendation. The Commis-
sion had found in excess of twenty percent of former Governor Brown's
nominees not qualified to serve as judges.
After the judge is appointed by the governor, he or she must stand
for election at the next general election. Trial judges are subject to a
non-partisan, contested election. Appellate judges are on the ballot for
voter approval of his or her retention. In theory, the appellate judge is
running on his record. I stress the theoretical nature of the ability of a
voter to assess an appellate judge's record based on my own experience
as an associate justice of the California Court of Appeal. I took my
oath of office as a California appellate judge on June 8, 1978, after
having been elected two days earlier, without opposition, to my third
term on the Superior Court. In November of the same year, some five
months later, my name appeared on the ballot as an associate justice
running unopposed on my record. By that time I had authored several
opinions whose merit had gained the approval of at least one of my
colleagues. As of election day, however, none of my work had been
published. When the polls closed, sixty-nine percent of the voters had
voted to retain me, I must assume, on the basis of my spotless and non-
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existent record. Thirty-one percent of the voters, on the other hand,
decided that I should not be retained in office based on the same phan-
tom record. I wonder what might have happened had the voters read
one of my opinions.
I have recounted this personal incident to illustrate the principal
flaw in our present system of selecting and retaining judges. Where
does the voter go to investigate the record of a judge whose name ap-
pears on his sample ballot? Can we really expect each voter to go to the
County Law Library and read the opinions of those appellate judges
whose term is ending? Even if the average voter somehow managed to
read the candidate's opinions, by what standard should a layperson
evaluate the quality of the judge's written expression? Is it reasonable
for us to expect that a layperson will do anything more than decide if
he agrees with the bottom line - reversal or affirmance? If the appel-
late court had determined that a criminal conviction must be set aside,
despite the evidence establishing guilt, solely because of a policeman's
blunder in making an arrest or search, or in advising an accused of his
constitutional rights prior to a voluntary confession, are any of us being
realistic in expressing our dismay that the voter may vote against the
author judge because the disposition of a particular case is unpopular?
Should judges be accountable to the electorate? If so, must judges
be responsive to current social attitudes of a majority of the populace
on matters which come before the court? Can we legitimately apply
democratic principles to the fair administration of justice in our courts?
Our state government is divided into three branches. Suppose a
majority of the public wishes to extend the death penalty, increase the
punishment for cocaine use, abolish involuntary busing of school chil-
dren, control hand guns, control rents, provide attorneys for victims in
criminal cases, permit prayer in our schools, abolish the exclusionary
rule, abolish inheritance taxes, or deny pretrial bail to all persons ac-
cused of rape. A responsible member of the legislative branch has a
choice on these sensitive issues. He or she can act according to his or
her own social, political, ethical, or economic views - realizing that if
a majority of his or her constituents disagree strongly enough his or her
career in Sacramento will be soon terminated. Or, he or she can find
out where a majority of his or her constituents stand, vote against his or
her own personal views, and build a popular record to present to con-
stitutents. If engaged in a political campaign, he or she can seek the
support of special interest groups by promising to support or oppose
legislation which they support or oppose.
A governor also has the same freedom of choice either to carry out
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official duties according to a personal set of values, sometimes at great
political risk, or to prudently follow the will of the majority. The death
penalty often presents this moment of truth to California governors. A
governor may have openly expressed his view that the death penalty
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and yet refuse to exercise his
clemency powers to save a condemned person - without damage to
reputation for integrity or re-election chances. When a governor runs
for re-election he or she may vigorously defend official decisions on
controversial social issues and enthusiastically attack his opponent's
contrary positions.
Contrast the above with the dilemma of a California judge facing
an election. An appellate justice must run on his or her record. A trial
judge cannot comment on pending matters or speak out on current so-
cial issues which may end up in litigation. A lawyer who believes
strongly that school busing is wrong, that all convicted felons should go
to prison, or that children should be allowed to pray in school may
oppose an incumbent trial judge so as to have an opportunity to change
the law of decided cases consistent with his or her views. The chal-
lenged judge may not comment on any of these issues because they are
likely to come before the court for review. The judge's opponent has
no such ethical constraints. In a recent contested municipal court elec-
tion in Pasadena, an attorney told the voters that his opponent had
never sentenced anyone to state prison. This accusation was remarka-
ble because, had the incumbent done so, he would have usurped his
jurisdiction. The appalling fact is that this unquestionably fraudulent
campaign gained the challenger forty-eight percent of the vote. This
type of deceitful and unethical tactic obviously places the incumbent
judge in an extremely vulnerable position on election day.
More disturbing, however, is the fact that a partisan campaign
against certain appellate judges in California was formally proposed by
one of our two major political parties. The plan was rejected, not be-
cause it was wrong, but due to a scarcity of funds. Partisan politics has
moved from the selection process to the retention election. Such a re-
sult was predictable and inevitable given the fact that under our present
California system, the appointment of judges is in the hands of a
politician.
The appointment of judges by an elected politician can lend itself
only to the logical inference that regardless of the academic merits or
professional credentials of the candidate, the person chosen reflects the
social, political, and economic views of the governor. If we elect a
"law-and-order" candidate for governor who supports capital punish-
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ment, should we really be surprised if he attempts to choose supreme
court judges who share his views on crime and punishment?
If, at the next election, a majority of the electorate also favors capi-
tal punishment, can we reasonably be dismayed that a supreme court
justice facing a retention election may be judged by some voters ac-
cording to how he or she voted on the constitutionality of capital pun-
ishment? Under our present system, the only record the nonlawyer
understands is the one presented by the media or the justices' decisions
on matters of great public interest.
A political reality is that the voter may incorrectly assess the
judge's personal views. Under the Canons of Judicial Ethics, the judge
is probably not allowed to disclose his private thoughts on any issue
which may come before the court.
The fact is that our present system of selecting judges authorizes a
governor to try to find a judge who mirrors his or her own political and
socio-economic views. He or she may even feel that he or she has a
mandate from the voters to do so based on his or her campaign
promises and the size of the vote in his or her favor. If, by the next
election, a majority of the voters becomes disenchanted with the in-
cumbent governor, is it totally illogical for some of the electorate to
suspect that the governor's judicial appointees may also be ill-suited for
their jobs?
I favor merit selection, evaluation, and retention of judges, and I
am very much opposed to our present system of political appointment.
A judge's responsibility is to interpret and apply the Constitution, legis-
lative enactments, and the decisions of higher courts to cases or contro-
versies presented to the court. This function must be performed by
relying on legal training and knowledge of the law, and cannot, in any
conscious way, be dependent upon personal or public opinion. A judge
may not consciously follow subjective social, political, or economic
views if the law requires a contrary result. Specifically, he or she can-
not perform his or her responsibilities in disregard of the law, in an
attempt to please a majority of the electorate.
If my definition of the role of the judge is correct, political ap-
pointment and contested elections are the worst possible way to select
persons committed to equal justice under the law. Political concerns
and survival tactics may dictate a governor's choice rather than excel-
lence in legal scholarship, legal experience, reputation as an outstand-
ing member of the legal community, traits of fairness, courtesy,
integrity, and patience. Under our present California system, the qual-
ity of our judges is dependent on the whims and political needs of our
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governor. If we are fortunate to have a governor with a sense of history
(for excellence of the judiciary, that is), we will be blessed with fine
judges. If the governor is concerned solely with survival at the next
election, we wil see unusual appointments which have little relation-
ship to merit or excellence.
The final step in the merit selection of judges is the retention elec-
tion. Most states have opted for retention election to permit the electo-
rate to participate in the process of the selection of persons to
administer a co-equal branch of government. Without such a control,
it is probable that many voters would not go along with the adoption of
a merit selection system.
Some states, including Alaska, have recently added a new concept
to merit selection. Under Alaska law, judges are appointed by the gov-
ernor from a list of at least two names submitted by the nominating
commission. After three years, a judge faces a retention election. If
retained, supreme court justices then serve a ten-year term prior to run-
ning again. Trial judges must run again at six-year intervals. In addi-
tion to evaluating and nominating candidates for judicial
appointments, the commission has a statutory duty to evaluate justices
and judges seeking retention. The surveys conducted by the commis-
sion are designed and controlled by the Institute for Social Research at
the University of Michigan. The judges are rated qualified or not qual-
ified for retention. A summary of the evaluation results are published
in the official election pamphlet that is mailed to each registered voter.
A judge rated unqualified is entitled to present a personal statement,
including the judge's response to the negative evaluation. New Jersey's
system of merit selection and retention also includes ongoing evalua-
tion of the sitting judges.
The District of Columbia has a unique variation of the Alaska sys-
tem. In D.C., the judges are nominated by an independent commission
and appointed to fifteen-year terms by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. A judge desiring reappointment must file a
declaration of candidacy with the District of Columbia Commission on
Judicial Disabilities and Tenure. The commission then prepares a
written evaluation of the judge's performance and a statement of fitness
for reappointment. A judge seeking reappointment who is rated excep-
tionally well qualified or well qualified is automatically reappointed. If
a judge is rated qualified, the President may reappoint him or her. If
the judge is rated unqualified, he or she is not eligible for
reappointment.
My hope in preparing these remarks is that some of you will share
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my view that the time is now to reform our system of judicial selection
to take politics out of our California court system. Further, we need to
provide our voters with an objective evaluation of a judge's perform-
ance so that there will be a record to review in determining if a judge
deserves retention. The exact system and procedure that we adopt is
not important. What is imperative is that we abandon. our present sys-
tem. We can draw upon the experience and statutes adopted in thirty
states to create our version of merit selection, evaluation, and retention.

